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Abstract: Conditional cash transfers are poverty reduction mechanisms that seek 
to increase demand of social services by combining an income effect with a health or 
education requirement. This demand-side strategy relies on a tacit assumption about the 
quality of and access to those services as a path to improve human capital outcomes. 
Some conditional cash transfers have included supply-side complementary incentives to 
ensure that services are suitable to deliver a good education and better health. This study 
reviews the existing evidence on the impact of supply-side incentives in the context of 
conditional cash transfers. The review finds that a limited number of studies estimate 
effects of supply in human capital outcomes and only a few impact evaluations consider 
the role of schools or health centers in enabling access. The evaluations revised find no 
evidence that supply side interventions coupled with conditional cash transfers directly 
improve program outcomes. Nonetheless, several studies highlight the relevance of 
school organization, in terms of school modalities and student/teacher ratios in school 
 vii 
enrollment and attendance. Impact estimations as well as the implementation of the 
supply-side programs also signal the need for a more nuanced understanding of how 
school management influences a variety of schooling outcomes. In general, the small 
number of impact estimations and the restricted set of variables used limits the 
generalizability of the results. For this reason, a principal conclusion of the review is the 
need for further research on the topic, as well as consistency across impact measures and 
a more in-depth analysis of school supply and their influence on learning outcomes. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have become a widely used program meant to 
improve educational and health outcomes in marginalized populations throughout the 
developing world. CCTs are poverty reduction mechanisms that seek to increase demand 
of social services by combining an income effect with a health and education 
requirement. This approach presumes that the supply of those social services is adequate 
and accessible. Nonetheless, this assumption is not consistent across sites of 
implementation, which can limit the capacity of the transfer to deliver expected goals 
(Morley & Coady, 2003; Valencia Lomeli, 2008). For this reason, some CCT programs 
include supply side interventions meant to bridge the gap between the demand and 
availability of these services. To better understand how these elements influence CCTs 
program outcomes, impact evaluations have started to consider how variations of 
implementation and supply-side interventions might affect expected goals.  
CCTs have been the objects of extensive scholarly literature on the targeting and 
design of these program as well as impact evaluations examining outcomes and some of 
its shortcomings. These impact evaluations have in turn given rise to several meta-
analysis on CCTs (Fizbein & Schady, 2009; Adato & Bassett, 2012; Hagen-Zanker, 
McCord, & Holmes, 2011) and one review that compares evaluations on conditional and 
unconditional transfers (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 2012). There are also 
numerous reviews that focus on specific impacts of CCTs such as health outcomes or 
education outcomes (Lagarde, Haines, & Hulme, 2007; Saavedra & Garcia, 2012). This 
review complements the existing literature by looking at supply-side interventions 
associated with CCTs and their effects on program outcomes.  
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The focus of this paper are those impact evaluations that go beyond estimating an 
average program effect, and try to disentangle each component of the program and their 
effects on certain educational and health outcomes. An in-depth understanding of the 
availability and quality of services in the context of CCTs is a necessary first step to 
unravel the mechanisms that make these programs successful for long-term objectives 
such as poverty reduction. This review of the evidence seeks to inform program design 
by assessing what elements must be in place to link the enforcement and fulfillment of 
the conditions to better human capital outcomes.   
The paper is structured as follows. First, I succinctly discuss the political and 
economic arguments that support CCT programs. Second, I explain the fundamental role 
that supply plays in accomplishing the intended social policy goals and then I discuss 
some challenges with designing an effective supply policy. A fourth section reviews the 
existing impact evaluation evidence, by starting with the more rigorous approaches to 
estimating supply-side effects and then presenting other strategies that shed light on how 
supply affects CCT outcomes. Finally, drawing from the lessons of the available 
literature, I argue in favor of certain requirements for an optimal evaluation design of 
supply effects on educational outcomes.  
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I. Conditional cash transfers: rationale 
CCTs seek to improve human capital outcomes as well as long-term poverty 
reduction. For this reason they include program features that address complementary 
human capital outcomes: education, health and nutrition. (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005) To 
improve such outcomes the cash transfer provides sufficient funds to influence household 
resources allocations, by decreasing the opportunity cost of accessing to human capital 
related goods. There are several studies that analyze such spending framework in the 
context of existing CCT programs, by comparing the costs of attending to school 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, as well as foregone earnings) and how they relate to 
existing benefits (utility of attending to school, savings in childcare, and future earnings). 
(Attanasio, Meghir, & Santiago, 2012; Todd & Wolpin, 2006)  Throughout this literature, 
there is a common concern over how CCTs influence intra-household resource 
distribution, and whether the improvements in human capital outcomes come with 
substantial trade-offs for other household members. (Behrman & Skoufias, 2010)  
The link between human capital outcomes and poverty reduction is subject to 
criticism. In particular, there is not enough evidence of the relation between modest 
educational outcomes, for example, and higher future wages. (Reimers, da Silva, & 
Trevino, 2006) More emphasis is needed in this topic to better understand how 
improvements in human capital will generate returns in the labor markets available in 
each CCT context. 
Economic theory with the analysis of utility functions indicates that an 
unconditional cash transfer increases utility more than a conditional one. Nonetheless, the 
inclusion of conditions can increase the efficiency of the transfer. If the household does 
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not have the same preferences as society in terms of investment in children outcomes, or 
there are other market failures in terms of availability of information and externalities, 
such as the positive returns to society of having an educated and healthy population, then 
a conditional transfer might be needed. However, the efficiency of the transfer can come 
with trade-offs in terms of equity, since when the condition is set on a normal good, then 
it is hard to establish which individuals get the transfer even though they would spend 
more on the good even without it. (Das, Do, & Özler, 2005) Moreover, the increase in 
consumption of the good that the transfer is conditioned on might come with a decrease 
in some close substitute, which could reduce or offset the positive human capital 
outcomes purposely induced by the transfer. 
Other reasons to support conditions on cash transfers come from the political 
economy of welfare programs in general. CCTs can garner political approval for their 
limited targeting by including conditions to change beneficiary’s behavior when 
disbursing public funds. (Fizbein & Schady, 2009) Beyond the theoretical reasons to 
support CCT, a meta-analysis comparing conditional and unconditional cash transfer has 
found greater effects for the first one especially in enrollment and attendance when the 
conditions are explicit and they are regularly monitored. (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & 
Woolcock, 2012) 
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II. The role of service supply 
The role of supply on CCTs can be analyzed through two related but different 
issues. First, CCTs target the demand for education and health services and thus, they can 
lead to an increase in the number of users, which might exceed the service capacity of the 
existing supply. Congestion is usually associated with a decrease in the quality of 
available programs and thus it affects the education and health outcomes of CCTs’ 
beneficiaries and other individuals that use those facilities. Some of the common 
solutions to this problem, such as a rise in prices or a fee, are not plausible in this context 
since they would counteract the needed increase in consumption that a CCT is meant to 
create. A second related problem is whether the existing program service is adequate for 
the development of CCTs’ human capital outcomes. This paper presents some evidence 
that congestion has not been an issue for several CCTs, but the main focus is on how the 
programs address and evaluate the pre-existing supply quality. 
The importance of supply-side interventions in the context of CCTs has been 
underscored in several studies. Nonetheless, a recent review of the evidence on these 
programs in Latin America points out that the availability of supply can be a major 
constraint for CCT programs: 
“CCTs are largely designed around the assumption that there is a “demand” 
constraint, that is, that families need incentives to participate in services. 
However, the services need to be available, offered at a reasonable distance, and 
of sufficient quality for the programs to work as intended. Inadequate quantity 
and quality of supply of health and education infrastructure, staff and supplies- 
and how to improve them in order for the program to work better-have challenged 
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most governments that have undertaken CCT programs.” (Adato & Hoddinott, 
2010, p. 354) 
Adato and Hoddinott highlight some of the existing challenges in the 
implementation of CCTs in conjunction with supply-side transfers, among them the 
difficulties in garnering support for such strategies in the complex institutional 
frameworks in which CCTs develop and the tensions between public and private 
contractors. Nonetheless, they consider that designing an effective supply side 
intervention and evaluating its outcomes is fundamental in the evolution of CCTs. Supply 
side limitations might hamper the efforts of school and health subsidies or they might 
limit their effectiveness on short-term and long-term outcomes that require access to 
quality services. The role of supply becomes even more important when implementing 
programs in new contexts that might not have the school and health infrastructure of the 
Latin American countries that pioneered CCTs.  
Schady and Fizbein also emphasize the importance of interventions that 
strengthen the supply and delivery of services, both in terms of expanding services and 
improving their quality, although they caution on the push to include such components in 
CCTs given the lack of evidence of their joint effects on education and health outcomes. 
The authors refer issues with the administration and coordination of funds for supply-side 
programs in Nicaragua’s “Red de Proteccion Social (RPS)” and Honduras “Programa de 
Asignación Familiar (PRAF)” as a note of caution on the use of supply side incentives in 
CCTs. In this line, they stress the need to assess the productivity and effectiveness of 
these policies relative to other standalone supply strategies. (Fizbein & Schady, 2009, pp. 
190-193) 
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The discussion of supply-side interventions is characterized by a limited 
understanding of what are the possible effects of more encompassing programs. Bastagli 
analyzes several of the implementation problems of the transfers, in terms of 
conditionality, targeting and institutional framework, but her evidence on synergies of 
supply and demand interventions is limited. For this reason, she concludes that 
strengthening supply could “possibly” lead to more effective outcomes. (Bastagli, 2010, 
p. 23) In addition, a review of the existing evidence on CCTs leaves out supply-side 
interventions even though they constitute an important part of many CCT programs. 
(Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 2012) 
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III. Designing supply-side interventions  
There is certainly an imbalance between the weight assigned to the supply of 
adequate educational and health services and how much is known about the status of such 
services, in the context of CCT implementation. This imbalance leads some authors to 
question the assumption that supply is adequate and there is a need for improvement only 
on the demand side of education and health programs in developing countries.   
Reimers, da Silva and Trevino highlight that lack of knowledge on the basic 
indicators of school quality such as instruction, teacher education and school 
management, limits evaluators’ ability to explain how CCTs lead to certain educational 
outcomes. (Reimers, da Silva, & Trevino, 2006) In particular, they point to the limited 
evidence on CCTs’ impact on student learning outcomes as well as more general human 
capital outcomes, given that very few evaluations analyze the role of school and 
instructional quality in student outcomes. Most of the CCTs programs, as stated before, 
assume that the quality of education or services provided is adequate. Reimers, da Silva 
and Trevino challenge this assumption and contest that many of the supply-side 
interventions meant to improve inadequate services are “poorly designed and 
implemented” (Reimers, da Silva, & Trevino, 2006, p. 11) 
“The fact that CCT programmes treat schools as “black boxes” may reflect a 
conceptual and disciplinary limitation in their design as much as an organizational 
limitation in how these programmes are set up institutionally. There are no 
incentives, and arguably large transaction costs, to design or evaluate CCT 
programmes with an eye to developing a coordinated strategy that takes on the 
task of improving quality.” (Reimers, da Silva, & Trevino, 2006, p. 46) 
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A coordinated demand/supply strategy can be hard to design, nonetheless, given 
the sparse and inconclusive evidence available on what enhances school quality and leads 
to better student outcomes. (Hanushek, 1995; Glewwe & Jacoby, 1994) Glewee, 
Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina review several studies of school resources and 
educational outcomes and conclude that there is not enough robust evidence on the effect 
of some school and teacher characteristics that are common targets of educational policy. 
(Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2014) They explain that a bundle of 
characteristics related to school infrastructure and teacher quality, consistently generates 
better student outcomes, but they cannot parse out the effects of those elements to 
provide ground for promoting one policy over another. The authors favor a new research 
agenda in education randomized controlled trials that tests how the organization of 
schools and the incentives faced by all stakeholders included in the educational process 
can lead to better educational outcomes.   
The need for a supply-side intervention spurs from assessments of how existing 
supply can cope with the increasing demand expected given a CCT, while ensuring high 
quality services. It is important to bear in mind that the long-term effect of many CCTs is 
poverty reduction, which cannot be accomplished by increasing just the access to 
services. Their quality must also be high to improve human capital outcomes in targeted 
populations. In the case of education, if quality varies across contexts, then traditional 
measures of schooling outcomes such as years of education, enrollment and attendance, 
might not lead to learning outcomes or improvements in human capital. 
A similar concern exists with the provision of health services and the fulfillment 
of conditions associated with the CCTs. A study in Mexican villages that receive a health 
related CCT, showed through site visits and interviews with health personnel and 
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patients, that the quality of services delivered in the context of the program was 
suboptimal. (Gutiérrez, 2008) In this qualitative study, the evaluators concluded that 
service delivery restricted the effectiveness of the cash transfer. Increasing access to 
health centers then, might not be an effective policy if the care received is not adequate. 
In addition, strategies that strengthen the supply through training and subsidies might 
have more lasting effects than only a demand side incentive. Another qualitative study on 
the supply-side incentives for performance of health providers in Nicaragua, showed that 
even after demand subsidies were interrupted the uptake of health services continued to 
be high among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the program. The evaluators 
consider that strengthening supply allowed for high quality service delivery as well as 
improved preventative health outcomes over time. (Regalía & Castro , 2007) 
Many CCTs seek to ensure an adequate quality of the services they are 
conditioned on by incorporating supply-side subsidies. Some of the programs include 
direct transfers to schools, they incentivize transfers from beneficiaries to the schools 
they assist to or they encompass complementary strategies to improve existing supply 
infrastructure through training, subsidizing needed provisions, etc. To better understand 
the role that the supply of education and health plays in CCTs in developing countries, I 
now turn to the existing impact evidence on the general features of supply and how it 
varies across regions and contexts.  
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IV. Impact evaluations 
THE EVIDENCE 
There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of supply-side interventions on 
human capital and health outcomes in the context of CCTs. Such scarcity is related to 
limited available data on school or health centers’ quality in impact evaluations and the 
piecemeal implementation of supply side incentives.  
First, many studies are unable to disentangle the supply and demand side 
incentives that constitute the cash transfer. In some cases, there is no available data on 
different supply characteristics, given that the evaluations are solely based in household 
and individual level data. When the program includes supply-side incentives in its design, 
some impact evaluations caveat their results by indicating that they correspond to the 
“whole” package of the CCT. Other evaluations incorporate supply-side variables as 
control in quasi-experimental designs, to indicate that there is some variability in what 
schools and health centers’ beneficiaries access to, but they do not further explore 
differential effects of the program in such scenarios. These indicators of supply quality 
vary in accuracy and sometimes they cannot be directly linked to the program under 
evaluation since they are more generally a control for existing differences between 
treatment and comparison groups.   
Second, a common problem in trying to estimate the effect of supply-side 
interventions that are coupled with CCTs is that these interventions are not implemented 
uniformly across units of treatment (usually villages or regions) and as a result, impact 
evaluations require additional assumptions and methods to create treatment measures. 
Such is the case of the PRAF in Honduras, which started with a robust design for 
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comparing demand, supply and combined interventions, but supply-side measures were 
not implemented in time for their evaluation. 
The impact evaluations discussed in this review represent different 
methodological approaches that seek to unravel the effect of service availability and 
quality in human capital outcomes. Given the emphasis on human capital development, 
this review leaves out the estimations that consider general household consumption as a 
CCT outcome. The more robust procedures incorporate estimations of the differential 
effect of CCTs supply components or an analysis of how demand-side incentives vary in 
effectiveness with diverse levels of service quality. Other evaluations consider indicators 
of service availability as controls in their regression models, whether to estimate program 
effects or to establish a counterfactual for the treatment group with an adequate 
comparison group. Finally, I discuss some strategies to adjust for different service quality 
with limited information. 
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS 
The eleven studies presented in this section provide an array of methodologies 
intended to estimate the differential effect of supply-side interventions. The evaluations 
that follow have in common the objective of incorporating outcome estimations at the 
individual level for supply quality indicators. They differ in their approach to impact 
evaluation, since some of them rely on experimental or quasi experimental designs, while 
others do not have control over the assignment to treatment or the general design of the 
program and thus need to adjust for differences between treatment and comparison 
groups. In the classification of their methodologies, I follow Wong, Cook and Shadish’s 
definition of experimental, quasi-experimental and non-experimental designs. (Wong, 
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Cook, & Shadish, 2008) 
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) 
The conditional cash transfer from Honduras, PRAF, included a rigorous 
experimental evaluation, in which 70 municipalities were randomly assigned to four 
different groups: 1) demand-side intervention, 2) demand and supply-side intervention, 3) 
supply-side intervention only and 4) control group. (Glewwe & Olinto, 2004, p. 3) The 
supply side component of the program, nonetheless, was only partially implemented by 
the time the evaluation was conducted. By 2002, the health supply component going to 
the Units of Primary Health was implemented only to 17% of the communities, there was 
no capacity building and the component on integral care of children was implemented to 
11-22% of the communities. The supply education component of PRAF also had limited 
implementation, the training of teachers reached 74% of intended beneficiaries, but 
transfers to schools were limited to a 7%. (IFPRI, 2003, p. 6) 
This review considers three mid-term evaluations of PRAF, between 2000-2002, 
which do not find positive effects for the supply-side program or the combined supply 
and demand programs. In general, the evaluations caveat their results given the partial 
implementation of the supply incentives.  A first evaluation of the intermediate effect of 
the program finds no positive program outcomes for the supply intervention or the 
combined supply/demand strategy, even though it finds positive outcomes for health 
services uptake and school enrollment, attainment and drop-out rates for the CCT alone. 
(IFPRI, 2003) 
Glewwe and Olinto concentrate their evaluation on the effects of PRAF on 
schooling outcomes: enrollment, attendance, drop out rates, grade promotion and on 
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children labor force participation during the same intermediate period. (Glewwe & 
Olinto, 2004) The authors also recognize that the supply component was not duly 
implemented, and thus, their conclusions on its effectiveness are intrinsically limited. 
Moreover, they explain that the municipalities that only received supply were interviewed 
during coffee harvest months in Honduras, while those in the demand-only treated 
municipalities, were interviewed during different months. This difference constitutes a 
threat to the validity of the data collected, especially in terms of results of labor force 
participation. Glewwe and Olinto found again no positive effects for supply side 
interventions of PRAF focused on schooling outcomes and labor force participation.  
A third evaluation of PRAF in Honduras focuses on the use of health services and 
the coverage of preventive health interventions. The evaluation finds no significant 
effects for the supply-side intervention, consisting of transferring resources to peripheral 
health service centers. The evaluators again caveat their results by explaining that the 
service-level intervention was not fully implemented by the time they conducted the 
evaluation. (Morris, Flores , Olinto, & Medina, 2004) 
Red de Protección Social (RPS) - Nicaragua  
Mallucio, Flores and Regalia evaluate the RPRS program in Nicaragua, which 
had a sizable supply component in the form of a “teacher transfer” provided to the 
beneficiary household to then disburse to the teacher. The rationale behind this portion of 
the cash transfer is that teachers have to cope with additional reporting requirements and 
bigger class size when students’ transfers are conditional on enrollment. (Maluccio, 
Murphy , & Regalia , 2009, p. 6). The study relies on random assignment of the program 
and thus, it can be considered experimental but it is an intent-to-treat approach since it 
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includes all households in the treated municipalities, even though close to 10% of them 
did not receive the cash transfer. Supply information comes from RPS administrative data 
on the school availability in the treated areas, from 2000-2004. In the design of the 
evaluation, the treatment group received the transfer for three years and then only the 
supply component for one year. Even though there was a substantive supply-side 
component in RPS, the evaluators cannot parse out its effect from the demand portion of 
the CCT, and so outcomes estimations are calculated for a combined supply/demand 
intervention. The evaluation incorporates supply-side variables at two levels: 1) program 
effect estimations are conditioned on initial supply and 2) program effects are calculated 
for schooling supply. The authors conclude that initial supply has a positive effect on all 
considered outcomes. One characteristic that was especially influential was the autonomy 
of the school. Nicaragua underwent a school reform in the 1990s that gave some rural 
schools or clusters of schools, more autonomy from the central government in decision 
making over pedagogy, administration and finance. The evaluators hypothesized that 
autonomous schools have more flexibility and can better adapt to changes in the demand 
for school and for these reasons, autonomy is associated with better educational 
outcomes. (Maluccio & Flores, 2005, pp. 16, 22) In the areas with poor initial supply, the 
program showed bigger effects in improving school quality (more room for 
improvement). 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades – Mexico 
Coady adopts a non-experimental approach to analyze the effect of supply-side 
policies in conjunction with a CCT program in Mexico. The Mexican program 
PROGRESA included supply incentives to cope with the increase in enrollment. He 
considers indicators of school quality by level of education in estimating PROGRESA’s 
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effect on enrollment, attendance and completed years of education. The author couples 
the CCT evaluation data with information from the Secretary of Public Education on the 
type of schools available at the locality level, by considering that each student from the 
control and treatment groups assist to the school closest to him/her. The main limitation 
of this approach is that given the proximity of treatment and control communities, 
children are most probably attending to the same schools and thus they cannot parse out 
the effect of the PROGRESA on the treated. (Coady, 2000, p. 54) For secondary school 
students, Coady finds that greater distance to school and having only a telesecondary 
school has negative effects in enrollment and for primary school students, a higher 
student/teacher ratio leads to a reduction in enrollment. Program effect estimations do not 
change when including supply-side variables as controls. The author concludes that there 
is no evidence of a differential improvement of supply in treatment communities, but he 
cannot rule out that school quality improved in both treatment and control communities. 
(Coady, 2000, pp. 60-63) 
 In a later paper, Coady and Parker adopt the same non-experimental approach to 
analyze the effect of supply-side policies with a similar set of school-level variables with 
data from the Secretary of Public Education. (Coady & Parker, 2002). Their strategy tries 
to isolate supply effects by controlling for certain indicators of school quality in their 
impact estimation models. Given that positive outcomes for the treated households 
remained unchanged even when controlling for supply characteristics, the authors 
conclude that the supply component of the program has no significant effects. 
Nonetheless, when incorporating data of supply expansion through the construction of 
new schools, they find that decreasing distance to school has a positive influence in 
enrollment to school as well as in extra years of education. They also find positive effects 
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for teachers’ human capital on girls’ enrollment and negative effects of student/teacher 
ratios for boys, at a 90% confidence level. 
In a medium term evaluation of PROGRESA/Oportunidades in the period 1998-
2003, Behrman, Parker and Todd study the impacts of the program in grade progression, 
completion and test scores. The authors consider the differential effects associated with 
the type of school and the student/teacher ratio with information gathered by the 
ENCEL2003 evaluation survey. They find that all the schooling outcomes they measure 
are higher in general and technical secondary schools, than in those schools that rely on 
teleconferences. (Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2008). They find that a lower student/teacher 
ratio also leads to a higher number of grades completed. 
Bobonis and Finan consider the impacts of the Mexican CCT on peers living in 
the same neighborhood as direct beneficiaries in the period 1997-2000. (Bobonis & 
Finan, 2009) Their hypothesis is that higher enrollment as a product of the condition for 
cash transfer recipients, can increase student/teacher ratios. The authors do not find 
substantive evidence supporting this hypothesis, since the number of teachers and 
student/teacher ratios between PROGRESA schools and non-PROGRESA schools are 
only slightly different in the first years of the program in secondary schools, but those 
differences tend to fade out in later years. Moreover, the program schools have teachers 
only slightly better educated. In general, they do not find evidence of changes in supply 
due to PROGRESA that could then translate into educational outcomes for peers living in 
the same neighborhood.  Nonetheless, they do not rule out indirect effects of the program 
as teachers could respond to the increase interest in school in different ways that they 
cannot analyze with the available data. The evaluators find positive effects of 
PROGRESA in peer’s probability of enrollment and grade progression, and this are 
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robust to the school quality variables already mentioned. (Bobonis & Finan, 2009, pp. 
711-712) 
 Another study of educational policy outcomes in Mexico compares the outcomes 
of PROGRESA with those of a supply side intervention, “Apoyo a la gestión escolar 
(AGE)”, that was implemented in the same localities. (Gertler, Patrinos, & Rubio-Codina, 
2007) The AGE Compensatory program included support to school management in the 
form of grants to parental associations, improvement of infrastructure and provision of 
school supplies and administrative and pedagogical training to all the educational staff. 
The study uses a non-experimental approach to find comparison localities, identified as 
those that did not receive the compensatory program and had less than 25% individuals 
receiving the cash transfer for the evaluation period. With a targeting index constructed 
from the 2000 Census data, the study balances covariates among treatment and 
comparison groups to ensure that their conclusions have causal value. Using a difference-
in-difference methodology, the authors estimated fixed effects at the school level and 
additionally control for other co-existing educational programs. They do not find positive 
effects for the bundle of the Compensatory program once controlling for the intensity of 
the cash transfer. Nonetheless, the component of “empowering parents” has a positive 
effect on preventing failure and repetition. The authors found that incentives for parent 
involvement in managing and monitoring educational quality have a positive role in 
educational outcomes and they conclude that “supply-oriented interventions should be 
redirected towards decentralizing school management and decision-making to the local 
level once basic input needs have been met.” (Gertler, Patrinos, & Rubio-Codina, 2007, 
p. 4) 
The Mexican CCT PROGRESA/Oportunidades also included a health cash 
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transfer intended to increase access to health services. Bautista Arredondo et al. evaluate 
the influence of health facilities quality in several outcomes in the period 1997-2000. 
(Bautista Arredondo, 2008) The evaluation relies on a non-experimental procedure that 
takes advantage of the roll out of the program during three years to distinguish treatment 
and comparison localities. The evaluators construct comparison groups from localities 
that had not received treatment at a certain point in time using propensity score matching. 
The study elaborates an index considering health facilities quality using the following 
variables: percentage of areas, supplies, equipment, medicines, and services provided, 
comparing what they should have or should provide, according to the type of unit. This 
index serves as a proxy variable to estimate the effect of the quality of health services on 
a number of outcomes related to prenatal and children’s health, metabolic syndrome, 
older population health and use of services. The study concludes that the index had 
almost no effect on indicators for specific illnesses but it had a positive effect in the 
general use of services. These results were considered an indication that the population 
was “responsive” to improved quality in health services. (Bautista Arredondo, 2008, p. 
227) 
Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles - Argentina 
In the case of the “Becas” program in Argentina, the evaluation considers some 
supply components when estimating program effects even though the program per se did 
not include a supply incentive. (Heinrich, 2006) This impact evaluation is non-
experimental since it compares treatment and control groups by balancing covariates 
through matching techniques. The evaluation estimates the differences in educational 
outcomes between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and beneficiaries of 1-year 
scholarship versus 2 years of scholarships or more. Heinrich considered several supply 
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variables among them indicators for school quality such as the average grade of all 
enrolled students, as well as administrative strategies to communicate and implement the 
program, including institutional climate and teacher support. She found that institutional 
capacity and conditions for learning and management had a positive effect on student 
performance. The evaluation also found a positive effect for the administrative support 
related to the Becas program in schooling outcomes.  
Impact evaluations of CCTs’ supply-side components present mixed evidence. 
Three out of the four programs considered in this section had substantive supply 
components. Their evaluation had limited internal validity given the lack of data on the 
supply variables directly affected by the supply-incentive or because there was partial 
implementation of that portion of the CCT. The conclusions from this set of robust 
supply evaluations cannot be easily generalized, since they respond to very specific 
program contexts and they use a variety of methodologies. 
The evaluations, nonetheless, yield some insights about the relevance of service 
quality as well as the effects of the CCT in supply-side measures. The evidence provided 
suggests a prominent role for the organization and management of schools and the 
participation of parents in schooling decisions, to promote better schooling outcomes. In 
the case of PROGRESA the access to institutions and certain type of schools were also 
related to better schooling outcomes, but it is not clear how the CCT program would 
affect such variables. In terms of the CCTs’ effects in supply availability, one study finds 
that teacher/student ratios do not increase as a result of the CCT, perhaps an indication of 
the school’s ability to adapt to changes in demand, while the study in Nicaragua 
recognizes that RPS helped improve supply in some areas that had lower quality schools 
at baseline. In the context of health services, one out of two studies found some effect for 
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an index of service quality on the general use of services. More evidence is needed to 
assess the value of health service features in delivering the expected goals of CCTs.  
CONTROLLING FOR THE QUALITY OF SUPPLY 
As discussed before, a common issue when including supply indicators in the 
estimation of program impacts is the lack of information or the inability to correlate 
evaluation data with other sources. Nonetheless, many times some available school 
quality information can be included in models that estimate program effects, as well as 
when creating adequate comparison groups if these are not available by the design of the 
evaluation. This particular use of supply variables in the assessment of cash transfer 
programs is crucial to understand the effect of service quality in the outcomes of interest. 
Moreover, such considerations can shed light on what are some of the important variables 
to be considered in the context of CCTs’ evaluations. 
Effects of supply at the school level 
The correlation between household outcomes and school and community level 
characteristics might not be possible when there are no identifying indicators across data 
sources. Nonetheless, possessing such macro level information can provide insights on 
CCTs’ effects at the school or municipality level. A study of the Bolsa Escola/Familia in 
Brazil considers the differential effect of the CCT given certain school quality 
characteristics in girls education at the school or municipality level. Using census data 
from 1998-2005, the authors consider a wealth of quality indicators such as 
characteristics of school facilities and teacher training. They find that in general, the 
Bolsa cash transfer has larger effects in enrollment, drop out rates, grade promotion and 
repetition in higher quality schools. (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012, p. 27) Nonetheless, their 
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approach is limited because they cannot identify what features of supply are valuable to 
improve individual effects. 
Another study considers the effect of PROGRESA in schools performance, as 
average test grades of all students in each grade. Without identifying particular students 
or distinguishing between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the authors estimate the 
effect of having some PROGRESA students in a school’s average math, writing and 
reading scores. (Mancera, Andrade, Barrios, Serna, & García, 2009) They conclude that 
most of the variation in student performance at the average school level can be explained 
by individual and socio-economic characteristics of schools. In addition, they find that 
when controlling for such indicators and school quality, the PROGRESA schools have 
equal performance as non-PROGRESA schools. (Mancera Corcuera, Serna Hernández, & 
Priede Schubert, 2008, p. 88) 
The influence of supply in program effect estimations 
A second group of papers includes supply variables as control variables in their 
estimation models, that is, they condition their outcome estimations on such variables. In 
general, these strategies rely on some group of community level features that are used to 
better isolate the effect of the program on the treated households. This strategy is 
adequate when even though the cash transfer is randomly distributed at the community 
level, there are concerns that beneficiaries have access to substantially different services 
than control households. In such cases, a model controlling for supply features in the 
community, can accurately capture how these affect individual educational or health 
outcomes. A set of common supply-side variables included as controls in program 
outcome estimation are student/teacher ratios and type of school referring to school 
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organization and distance to school, which is a proxy for the cost of school and it also 
measures the accessibility to services.   
Student/teacher ratios 
In general, student/teacher ratios are negatively associated with on educational 
outcomes such as enrollment in PROGRESA/Oportunidades evaluations. Schultz 
explains that the teacher/student ratio is high even in rural primary schools in Mexico that 
received PROGRESA and he recommends a policy that addresses this issue as part of an 
improvement of service quality. (Schultz, 2004) As discussed in the previous section, 
Behrman, Parker and Todd provide support to the hypothesis that higher student/teacher 
ratios are detrimental for grade progression. (Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2008) Coady 
finds a negative effect of student/teacher ratios for enrollment at the primary level in 
Mexico. (Coady, 2000)  
A study in Pakistan considers the effects of a female stipend program and it finds 
that at baseline school quality is worse in the stipend program districts. They measure 
school quality using infrastructure indicators, such as water, electricity and toilet facilities 
availability, as well as average enrollment at the school level and student/teacher ratio 
and private/public schools ratios. When estimating absolute and percent change in girls’ 
enrollment, these variables seem positively related to enrollment but such correlation is 
not consistent across all models. (Chaudhury & Parajuli , 2012) 
 The variation of effects of the student/teacher ratio across sites is consistent with 
the findings of a recent review of school supply effects. In this review, the authors assert 
that there is a general negative effect on enrollment and other schooling outcomes, but 
that such effect might be small and as a result of random variation, appear as positive in 
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some cases. (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2014, pp. 38-39)  
A common concern with CCTs is that the condition on enrollment might increase 
student/teacher ratio in schools were beneficiaries enrolled. Parker in a study of 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades reports that the treatment villages do not show an increase in 
the student/teacher ratio contrary to the expectations, given the increase in enrollment. 
She considers that such results might indicate an effective administrative response to the 
program at the school level. Nonetheless, there is an increase in such ratio in middle 
schools. (Parker, 2003, p. 8) Bobonis and Finan also report small increases in the 
student/teacher ratios in treatment schools. (Bobonis & Finan, 2009)  
Baez and Camacho include student/teacher ratio and the square feet per student as 
proxies for educational quality and infrastructure available, respectively in their study the 
“Familias en Acción(FA)” CCT in Colombia. (Baez & Camacho, 2011) The inclusion of 
such variables is crucial given that they are assessing the effects of the CCT in student 
attainment (test scores in Math and Language) as well as the rate of students that finish 
high school over all the enrolled ones. They do not find substantial gains in these 
educational outcomes as a result of the FA program. In explaining their results, they point 
to the quality of schools in targeted areas as well as the effects of increased enrollment in 
teacher/student ratios, which they are unable to measure since they only possess 
information at baseline. (Baez & Camacho, 2011, pp. 2-3) Even though they include 
supply variables in their estimations of main effects, they do not provide information on 
the direction and significance of such controls. When reporting values at the baseline 
level, treatment and control are significantly different in terms of the available square feet 
per student. 
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Type of school 
In the case of several evaluations of the PROGRESA/Oportunidades program 
evaluators considered the type of school as an important indicator of school quality. In 
Mexico, secondary schools can be: general, telesecondary (using teleconference delivery) 
and technical schools. The program has differential effects depending on the type of 
school beneficiaries assist to. In the case of enrollment, Parker shows that PROGRESA 
had a larger effect in the enrollment in telesecondary schools and general secondary 
schools in rural and semi-rural areas. (Parker, 2003) As shown before, medium term 
impacts of the program in grade progression, completion and test scores, nonetheless, 
seem to be higher in general and technical secondary schools, than in those schools that 
rely on teleconferences. (Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2008). In line with these results, 
Coady also finds that when the closest school to a student is a telesecondary school, 
probability of enrollment decreases. (Coady, 2000) 
Distance to service centers 
Another common supply variable that is included in program outcome estimations 
is the distance to the service centers.  Distance can be considered a measure of the costs 
of accessing to health and education services. Todd and Wolpin confirm such framework 
for schooling outcomes by analyzing how distance to school influences enrollment 
decisions using data from the PROGRESA cash transfer. (Todd & Wolpin, 2006)  
When including distance to school as a measure of “access” to school, evaluators 
obtain mixed educational results. In the case of PROGRESA, villages had to have a 
primary school in the area to be eligible for the program. For this reason, primary school 
enrollment is unaffected by the distance to school. Nonetheless, in the case of secondary 
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school enrollment, the presence of the school is proven fundamental to increase 
enrollment rates, and in that context, distance to school is negatively correlated with kids 
attending school. (Schultz, 2004; Attanasio, Meghir, & Santiago, 2012)  Skoufias also 
includes distance to school in his estimation of PROGRESA’s effect on enrollment to 
school and child work, but he does not provide information on the direction and 
significance of the variable’s influence in the studied outcomes. (Skoufias & Parker , 
2001) Dubois, De Janvry and Sadoulet confirm the negative correlation between distance 
to a secondary school and educational outcomes, in their case, for grade continuation. 
They show distance to school tempers the effects of the transfer, which disappear for 
children that live more than 3 km away from school. By highlighting such heterogeneity, 
the authors show that that distance is a condition that affects CCTs effectiveness. 
(Dubois, de Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2012).  
Another study in Colombia concludes that distance to school has also a negative 
effect in school enrollment, but such effect is smaller than anticipated. (Attanasio, 
Fitzsimons, Gomez, Lopez, & Meghi, 2008) One study finds contradicting effects for a 
cash transfer in Cambodia. Evaluators explore the differential effects of the program on 
those girls that leave further removed from school and conclude that the enrollment 
effects of the CCT are larger for girls that leave at least four kilometers away from 
school. (Filmer & Schady , 2006)  
In the evaluation of health outcomes, the distance to health centers is also a 
common proxy for the cost of accessing to services. An evaluation of a CCT in India, 
concludes that distance to such centers is not significantly related to the uptake of cash 
transfer and maternal health services. (Lim, Dandona, Hoisington, James, Hogan, & 
Gakidou, 2010) Other possible strategy to assess health service quality is to analyze 
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beneficiaries’ perspectives on such services, in the same line as the study of PROGRESA 
previously reviewed.  (Bautista Arredondo, 2008) A study in Tanzania considers the 
effect of the treatment in the perception of public service quality. They find that being a 
CCT beneficiary does not increase the likelihood of rating school or health facilities 
higher. (Evans, Hausladen, Kosec, & Reese, 2014)  
Creating comparison groups 
Supply-side variables are important when trying to establish an adequate 
comparison group. An evaluation of health outcomes of a CCT in Burkina Faso considers 
the characteristics of health services when assessing comparability between control and 
treatment groups. The authors do not include these variables in their estimation of 
program outcomes. (Akresh, de Walque, & Kazianga , 2012) In the case of a CCT 
evaluation in the Philippines, the evaluators collect information on the quality of health 
services (average number of health workers, age of health workers, number of patients 
and villages served and instruments used) and the characteristics of schools (student-
teacher ratio, student-classroom ratio and other educational outcomes at the school level) 
in treatment and comparison groups to ensure that they are similar on those indicators. 
(Chaudhury, Friedman, & Onishi, 2013)  
In the case of an evaluation of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, the evaluators include 
school supply measures in their estimation of propensity scores for creating a matched 
comparison group. They use the number of schools per capita and the number of students 
per elementary class as indicators of the municipality’s school quality. (Brauw, Gilligan, 
Hoddinott, & Roy, 2014) 
Parker uses several school quality indicators, among them how many classrooms 
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are in use, the number of groups, number of teachers and number of teachers per gender 
in her study of the PROGRESA/Oportunidades program. (Parker, 2003) She only 
includes them in the baseline assessment of control and treatment groups, not only to 
balance them on those covariates but because she considers that the program could 
change these characteristics. For this reason, if these supply-side measures were to be 
included in the program estimation they could capture some of the program impact and 
then lead to an ”underestimate” the total effect. (Parker, 2003, p. 18) Baez and Camacho 
use a similar approach in their study of a CCT in Colombia, that is, they only include 
baseline school quality information in their models for program effect estimation. (Baez 
& Camacho, 2011)  
Other considerations of supply-side variables 
Some cash transfer evaluations consider a bundle of supply and demand side 
interventions, and thus they understand program outcomes as the effects of these 
combined strategies. Such is the case of studies of Nicaragua’s RPS (Maluccio & Flores, 
2005) or Honduras’ PRAF (Rackstraw, 2014).  Behrman, Sengupta and Todd propose an 
indirect way of analyzing the effects of supply-side interventions by exploring spillover 
effects of ineligible children attending schools that receive PROGRESA funds. Such a 
component of the program was meant to offset any burden to schools given the increase 
in enrollment. The authors consider that the inexistence of spillover effects is an 
indication of the lack of supply-side effects for the CCT.  (Behrman, Sengupta, & Todd, 
2005, p. 260) 
Finally, a group of evaluations includes school fixed effects to ensure that they 
control for some of the unobservable characteristics of schools that might affect 
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educational outcomes for individuals that attend to the same institution. Some examples 
include studies of Cambodia’s scholarship program (Ferreira, Filmer, & Schady , 2009), 
another study in Bangladesh (Khandker, Pitt , & Fuwa , 2003) and a study in Colombia 
(Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, & Perez-Calle, 2011). An evaluation of Honduras’ 
PRAF includes fixed effects for the intervention’s group, since the cash transfer included 
supply-side variables by groups. (Rackstraw, 2014) This is a less informative use of 
supply considerations, since the results do not provide insights on what specific supply 
elements affect the educational outcomes of interest in CCT evaluations or whether 
variations of school quality across schools are associated with different levels of program 
effects. 
CHALLENGES IN EVALUATING SUPPLY-SIDE CONDITIONS 
Throughout this review, it becomes clear that the studies’ emphasis on service 
quality is not always correlated with the role of supply in the cash transfer program itself. 
It is more often related to the availability of administrative information on school or 
health centers supply as well as the original design of the evaluation. In the following 
sections, I concentrate the discussion on educational outcomes given the limited evidence 
on the role of supply incentives in health sector CCTs. The evaluations reviewed provide 
important insights into some of the challenges that any educational study faces. First, data 
availability is limited and sometimes hard to match with the existing evaluation 
information, especially if that survey data is collected at the household level. 
Second, even when those data are available, there is substantive variation in the 
types of variables considered as proxies of school quality or management. As shown in 
the previous section, teacher/student ratio and the modality of the school are commonly 
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used as indicators of school quality but the results associated with them are mixed. 
Another set of indicators analyzes school access, for example by using distance to school, 
which is usually considered a pre-condition for CCTs to work. Finally, school 
management and administration has a positive effect according to several evaluations, 
which signals the primary role that schools play in implementing CCTs. The more robust 
analyses consider a set of these characteristics using individual and school level 
information. Nonetheless, researchers and evaluators alike struggle to establish an 
adequate set of supply measures that can help estimate the effect school quality on 
educational outcomes. There are intrinsic limitations with some of the proxy variables for 
teachers’ characteristics, school infrastructure and access and as mentioned before, the 
evidence on their effects is not conclusive. (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 
2014) 
The need for including service quality indicators is particularly critical when the 
programs affect initial supply conditions and there are concerns over the “congestion” of 
services. School management can be instrumental to adapt to such changes in demand, as 
suggested by the Nicaraguan CCT evaluation. (Maluccio & Flores, 2005) To this respect, 
evaluations that include supply as an “outcome” are also interesting, even though it is 
hard to isolate the effect when the strategies on supply and demand are intertwined in the 
implementation. 
Similarly, the studies showed ample variation in the outcome variable considered. 
Most of the decisions on which program outcomes to measure depends on the program 
design. Nonetheless, when studying the supply of services it is important to consider 
which of those outcomes can be effectively affected by changes in the supply of services. 
Many evaluations of educational CCTs report enrollment rates, attendance or drop out 
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rates instead of school attainment. Nonetheless, this focus has several limitations and it 
crystalizes a bias toward reporting access outcomes versus other measure of schooling 
success, even though the second ones can be more informative of human capital 
improvement. It is suggestive that in many other studies of the quality of education 
outside the CCT realm, supply is primarily linked to student learning outcomes such as 
test scores. (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2014)  
Third, the role of supply throughout the evaluations analyzed proved to be highly 
contextual, which makes an in-depth assessment of the existing supply very important. 
Qualitative studies that collect participant and implementers’ observations can be 
particularly useful to parse out the needs and constraints of existing supply in different 
developing countries. Such studies coupled with quantitative comparisons of baseline and 
after program supply conditions are instrumental to understand the effects of school 
quality.  
Fourth, several evaluations encounter issues in defining the right unit of analysis. 
Many of the cash transfers were randomized at the locality level, partly to avoid ethical 
problems of withholding treatment and to make implementation easier. Nonetheless, 
school characteristics might vary within a village and also, within schools themselves and 
across grades. It is unclear how the models presented in the reviewed papers could 
estimate and explain intra and inter school variation of student outcomes. One of the 
papers mentions that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries would receive the same supply 
conditions in certain schools, which can produce an underestimate of the supply effect on 
the treated. (Coady, 2000) In the case of school supply, detailed information on some of 
the indicators of organization, infrastructure and teacher characteristics can be 
particularly important to estimate spillover effects. 
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V. Requirements for optimal evaluation designs 
The evaluations in this review present a range of methodologies that vary in their 
ability to estimate the effects of supply, that is in how well they can attribute measured 
outcomes to the program (internal validity). The studies also have shown diverse levels of 
validity in terms of generalizability (external validity). Random assignment to treatment 
including demand and supply-side interventions, as well as supply-side alone, is a 
powerful design to ensure adequate comparison and treatment groups. When the study 
was not designed to consider supply effects, nonetheless, coupling evaluation data with 
other sources can provide useful estimations as well, as long as the evaluation considers 
the effects of such supply-side interventions on the outcomes of interest. A variation of 
this model combines supply and demand programs using statistical modeling and it can 
also provide useful estimations of program effects. Finally, many evaluations consider 
supply-side variables in their model, to estimate differential effects of treatment, in some 
cases through interaction terms, and other include them just to ensure that the accuracy of 
their program effect estimations.  
The available evidence provides some insights on the features of an optimal 
evaluation of supply-side incentives in CCTs. A best-case scenario is the availability of a 
robust evaluation design of supply-side policies coupled with CCTs, such as the one 
present for PRAF. In this design, a supply-side intervention is randomized, most probably 
at the locality level, and as a result, the evaluator does not need to have extensive 
information on the existing quality of supply to ensure comparability across treatment 
and control groups.  Nonetheless, the collection of such information proves fundamental 
in the “real world”, where problems can arise in the implementation of the program and 
complicate the evaluation design.  
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The supply component in this best-case scenario design can target a selected 
characteristic of supply, for example school infrastructure, given the major role played by 
access to school in CCTs educational outcomes. Not every supply component lends itself 
to randomization, nonetheless, given that certain features of school quality are difficult to 
measure and manipulate in the context of program evaluation. School management, for 
example, is often related to institutional practices and policy changes over which 
evaluators have little control. In terms of school organization, evaluators can allocate 
different class sizes or student/teacher ratios to consider supply effects on program 
outcomes. School inputs and teacher characteristics are also amenable to random 
assignment across different schools to explore supply impacts on educational indicators. 
If having to choose one element of supply over the other, evaluators must not only 
consider the feasibility of their randomization but also how well those elements address 
service supply limitations in the backdrop of scarce evidence on their effects. Another 
option is to create a bundle of strategies meant to improve the overall quality of the 
educational service, but this alternative can face political backlash given the cost 
associated with it in conjunction with CCT expenditures. In each of these cases, program 
advocates have to harness support supply improvements and then justify the need for its 
randomized allocation, which can face ethical and/or legal barriers. Resource constraints 
might tilt the balance one way or the other but in any case it is important to inform 
program design and evaluation with a thorough analysis of the supply available in each 
context and how demand-side incentives interact with the existing services. 
More importantly, the evaluator needs to carefully select the variables that can 
measure program agency beyond the treatment status. This set of variables will 
fundamentally depend on the context, but they should be linked to what a supply-
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incentive can effectively change at the school level. For example, the RPS in Nicaragua 
disbursed funds to teachers indirectly, but the evaluation did not include an efficient 
measure of how teachers were affected by such policy beyond the student/teacher ratio. 
On the part of outcomes, the evaluation should go beyond measures of access to school, 
such as enrollment and attendance, to explore the effect of supply-side incentives in 
learning outcomes when these are available. A greater number of these indicators can 
unpack the mechanisms by which the characteristics of schools can affect educational 
outcomes and inform education policy.  
In fact, beyond the evaluation of supply-side incentives in the framework of 
CCTs, the present review has highlighted the lack of information on the general 
availability of educational and health supply. More studies in this direction can help 
understand how supply of these services reacts to an increase in demand. If evaluations 
incorporate a greater wealth of supply variables, then they will also provide insights on 
how the cash transfer effects vary across different levels of supply. An emphasis on 
schools’ organization and management could be adequate to explain variation in student 
outcomes across schools. If these measures are built-in to a data collection procedure, 
especially in the context of the administrative data already available to track fulfillment 
of conditions, then policy-makers will have a more complete picture of how CCTs lead to 
improvements in human capital outcomes and poverty reduction.  
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Conclusion 
CCTs might not be a magic bullet for human capital improvement in developing 
countries if they are conditioned on a supply that is inefficient, difficult to access or of 
poor quality. By reviewing the available impact evidence on the different ways in which 
supply influences CCT program outcomes, I have demonstrated the need for further 
research on several aspects. Rigorous estimates of how the supply of health services 
shapes preventive health outcomes remains thin compared to qualitative studies on those 
characteristics. A similar story appears in the context of educational outcomes, with a 
large number of evaluations based on the same supply-side variables and a limited 
number of outcomes, which only suggest the mechanisms that increase access to schools 
but do not address processes that provide better learning outcomes. 
This review has limitations in terms of access to resources and gray literature on 
the topic. Nonetheless, it provides a rough picture of how CCT impact evaluation 
evidence deals with supply-side incentives and measures. A more complete study could 
also include an analysis of non-CCT evaluations, such as those that center on 
unconditional cash transfers which are also heavily based on the assumption that there is 
an adequate supply of services.  
Throughout the review, the relevance of school organization was highlighted with 
evidence from several studies, in terms of school modalities and student/teacher ratios. 
Impact estimations as well as considerations on the implementation of the supply-side 
programs highlighted the need for a more nuanced understanding of how school 
management influences a variety of schooling outcomes. The small number of 
evaluations that estimated effects of supply-side interventions found no positive effects 
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for such component of the CCTs but their impact estimations faced several limitations, 
among them partial implementation or treatment identification problems. More evidence 
on supply-side features can provide information needed to adapt CCTs to other contexts 
outside of Latin America, as well as help these programs evolve to ensure that they 
accomplish the longer-term objectives of poverty reduction. 
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Appendix 
METHODOLOGY 
Searching Protocol 
The search methodology included a pool of impact evaluations of conditional 
cash transfers of which only those with some reference to supply were considered. The 
final subset of robust evaluations of supply included effect estimations for supply on 
individual educational and health outcomes. 
Table 1: Screening Procedure for the sample of studies 
Searching Procedures Number of Articles 
Phase 1: impact 
evaluations of CCTs 
Electronic search  139 
 Unable to access 12 
Phase 2: separate 
ineligible articles 
Articles considered 32 
 
Reason 
Ineligible 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
9 
 Implementation 
evaluation 
21 
 CCT/UCT or 
just UCT 
evaluation 
20 
 Impact 
evaluation 
without supply 
considerations 
57 
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Phase 3: analysis of 
supply 
Articles with robust 
methodology 
11 
 Other articles with supply 
considerations 
21 
Some of the screening questions considered in the review of the papers was: What 
supply component does the intervention include? What is their methodology: 
experimental, quasi-experimental or non-experimental and which supply variables do 
they include? How accurate and informative are their school quality indicators? Where do 
they find information about supply? What are the limitations of the study? 
Sources considered 
The search for papers covered several electronic search engines and databases, as 
well as website repositories of evaluations and agency specific sites. Moreover, the paper 
search also included other meta-analysis bibliographies and an extensive search guided 
by program designs, to find evaluations of those programs that included a supply-side 
component.  
Databases: Ebsco, JSTOR, Social Science Citation Index, IE3 Impact Evaluations 
Publisher platforms: Wiley Interscience, Sage Journals, and CAB Direct 
Websites: Internal Food Policy Research Institute, USAID, Centre for Global 
Development, World Bank Research Observer, Independent Evaluation Group, 
UNESCO, UNICEF, ResearchDFID, ILO, Poverty Action Research Lab, International 
Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, Overseas Development Institute, Transfer Program, 
Governance Resource Centre, IDEAS. 
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Bibliographies of several papers, among them, (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & 
Woolcock, 2012; Adato & Hoddinott, Conditional Cash Transfer in the Second Decade: 
Current Debates and New Frontiers, 2010; Fizbein & Schady, 2009; Rawlings & Rubio, 
2005; Reimers, da Silva, & Trevino, 2006; Morley & Coady, 2003)  
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SUMMARIES OF MAIN STUDIES 
Table 2: Studies Included in this review 
 
Paper Evaluation 
Design 
Outcomes  Supply Variables  Conclusions on 
supply 
IFPRI, 2003, 
Proyecto 
PRAF/IBD: 
Impacto 
Intermedio 
Experimental 
method with 70 
municipalities 
assigned 
randomly to 
four different 
groups: 1) 
demand side 
intervention 
only for 20 
municipalities, 
2) Demand and 
supply side 
interventions 
for 20 
municipalities, 
3) Supply side 
intervention 
only for 10 
municipalities, 
4) Control 
group without 
intervention for 
20 
municipalities. 
The evaluation 
focuses on the 
supply-side 
incentives 
alone (group 3) 
and the supply 
and demand 
program (group 
2). The study 
estimates the 
mean impact of 
offering the 
treatment 
• Health services 
access 
• Enrollment 
• Attendance 
• Enrollment 
• Drop-outs 
• Consumption 
• Supply is 
controlled by 
design 
No positive 
program 
outcomes for the 
supply 
intervention or 
the combined 
supply/demand 
strategy, even 
though the 
evaluation finds 
positive 
outcomes for 
health services 
uptake and 
school 
enrollment, 
attainment and 
drop-out rates for 
the conditional 
cash transfers 
alone. 
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(intent to treat 
strategy). 
Glewwe & 
Olinto, 2004, 
Evaluating the 
Impact of 
Conditional 
Cash Transfers 
on Schooling in 
Honduras: An 
experimental 
approach  
Same 
experimental 
design as above 
for the period 
2000 to 2002, 
with baseline-
follow up 
estimations as 
well as 
intermediate 
ones. 
• Enrollment  
• Drop-out rates 
• Attendance  
• Grade promotion 
• Labor force 
participation 
• Simulation of final 
school attainment 
• General 
information on the 
school (days open, 
number of grades, 
etc.) 
• Characteristics of 
teachers) 
• Pedagogical aids 
(library books, 
dictionaries, paper 
etc.) 
• School 
organizations 
(PTA, teachers 
association, etc.).  
 
In contrast with 
the success of 
demand side 
interventions, the 
supply side 
intervention had 
no effect on any 
outcomes, which 
is not surprising 
given that most 
parts of it were 
never 
implemented by 
the follow up 
year, 2002. 
Morris, Flores , 
Olinto, & 
Medina, 2004, 
Monetary 
incentives in 
primary health 
care and effects 
on use and 
coverage of 
preventive 
health care 
interventions in 
rural Honduras: 
cluster 
randomised trial 
 
Experimental 
evaluation of 
the health 
portion of the 
PRAF 
conditional 
cash transfer, 
consisting on 
transferring 
resources to 
peripheral 
health service 
centers.  
Results are 
limited because 
the resources to 
health centers 
were not fully 
implemented 
when the 
evaluation was 
conducted due 
to legal issues. 
Indicators of service 
use   
• Antenatal care 
• 10-day post-
partum check-up 
•  Child taken to 
health center at 
least once in last 
30 days 
Indicators of coverage 
of preventive health 
interventions  , 
including Tetanus, 
Measles, 
DTP1/pentavalent 
vaccines and weight.  
 
 
 
 
 
Municipality-level 
features 
• Mean (SD) 
number of doctors 
or nurses, or both, 
in government 
health centers per 
10000 population 
Household-level 
features: 
• Median (IQR) 
distance to nearest 
health center, on 
foot, in min 
 
The evaluation 
finds no 
significant 
effects for the 
supply-side 
intervention. The 
lack of effects 
could be 
explained by the 
partial 
implementation 
of the service-
level incentive. 
Coady, 2000, 
The Application 
of Social Cost-
Benefit Analysis 
to the 
The study uses 
a quasi-
experimental 
strategy to 
analyze the 
• Enrollment 
• Attendance levels 
• Completed years 
of education 
For secondary school 
students: 
• Distance to the 
closest secondary 
No difference in 
program 
outcome 
estimation when 
including supply-
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Evaluation of 
Progresa 
effect of 
supply-side 
improvements 
in a series of 
educational 
outcomes. The 
identification 
strategy 
consists in 
combining data 
from the 
experimental 
design with 
information on 
school quality, 
by assuming 
that students 
assist to the 
school that is 
closest to them. 
There is 
potential for 
bias of these 
estimates since 
localities are 
very close to 
each other, and 
therefore, 
children might 
need to assist to 
school in 
control 
communities. 
school and its 
square 
• Type of secondary 
school available. 
• Education level of 
the teacher. 
• Percentage of 
children who 
reported failing the 
previous year 
For primary school 
students:  
• Student/teacher 
ratio 
• Distance to school 
side variables in 
program effects 
estimations for 
secondary 
schools, and 
slightly smaller 
effects for 
primary school. 
There is no 
evidence of a 
differential 
improvement of 
supply in 
treatment 
communities, but 
the study does 
not rule out that 
school quality 
improved in both 
treatment and 
control 
communities. 
Greater distances 
to school and 
only having a 
telesecondary 
school, decreases 
probability of 
enrollment. 
Student/teacher 
ratio has a 
negative effect 
on enrollment.  
Coady & Parker, 
2002, A Cost-
Effectiveness 
Analysis of 
Demand and 
Supply Side 
Education 
Interventions: 
The case of 
PROGRESA in 
Mexico 
This evaluation 
adopts a similar 
non-
experimental 
approach as the 
previous one to 
analyze the 
effect of supply 
side-measures 
in conjunction 
with the cash 
transfer. It 
incorporates 
information 
• Enrollment • Distance to the 
closest secondary 
school and its 
square  
• Type of secondary 
school  
• Education level of 
the teacher 
• Percentage of 
children who 
reported failing the 
previous year 
• Teacher/student 
By including 
supply controls, 
the study 
concludes that 
conditional cash 
transfers are 
principally 
running the 
program results. 
Distance to 
school was an 
important 
determinant of 
enrollment. 
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about school 
construction to 
test the effects 
of the CCT for 
different levels 
of school 
access. 
ratio  
 
Other school 
quality indicators 
showed mixed 
results. Teachers’ 
human capital 
had a positive 
effect on girls’ 
enrollment and 
negative effects 
of 
student/teacher 
ratios for boys, at 
a 90% 
confidence level. 
Gertler, 
Patrinos, & 
Rubio-Codina, 
2007, Do 
Supply-Side-
Oriented and 
Demand-Side-
Oriented 
Education 
Programs 
Generate 
Synergies? 
Evidence from 
Rural Mexico 
Non-
experimental 
comparing a 
CCT with a 
School 
Management 
Program. The 
study identifies 
comparison 
localities as 
those that did 
not receive the 
compensatory 
program and 
had less than 
25% 
individuals 
receiving the 
cash transfer 
for the 
evaluation 
period. The 
evaluation uses 
a targeting 
index 
constructed 
from the 2000 
Census data to 
balance 
covariates 
among 
treatment and 
comparison.  
• School- aggregate 
probability of 
failing an exam 
• Repetition rates 
• Dropout rates  
Compensatory 
intervention as a 
package and divided 
into the three 
components:  
• School 
Management 
Support (AGEs) to 
parent and teacher 
associations  
• Supplies provision  
• Teacher and 
administrative 
staff training. 
No positive 
effects for the 
bundle of the 
Compensatory 
program once 
controlling for 
the intensity of 
the cash transfer. 
The component 
of “empowering 
parents” has a 
positive effect in 
reducing failure 
and repetition. 
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Bautista 
Arredondo, 
2008, Ten years 
of 
Oportunidades, 
Effects on 
Health Service 
Utilization and 
Health Status  
Non-
experimental 
approach based 
on the time 
spent on the 
program (all 
localities 
included are 
treatment 
localities). 
Comparison 
groups created 
through 
propensity 
score matching. 
The groups 
created were: 
treated in 1998, 
treated in 2000 
and control in 
2003. Supply 
variables are 
considered at 
the locality 
level. 
• Number of 
prenatal visits 
• Doctor attended 
birth 
• Children sought 
attention in the 
previous two weeks 
• Biological 
measurements of 
the women 
evaluated for 
metabolic 
syndrome 
• Older population 
health condition, 
coverage and use 
of services  
• Community 
characteristics in 
terms of 
low/medium/medi
um-high/high 
structural quality 
• Health clinic, 
community clinic 
and private. 
The health 
service quality 
index had almost 
no effect on 
indicators for 
specific illnesses 
but it had a 
positive effect in 
the general use 
of services. 
These results 
were considered 
an indication that 
the population 
was “responsive” 
to improved 
quality in health 
services. 
Behrman, 
Parker, & Todd, 
2008, Medium 
Term Impacts of 
Oportunidades  
Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
on Rural Youth 
in Mexico 
Quasi-
experimental 
study. It 
evaluates the 
differential 
effect of the 
program on 
children that 
assist to certain 
type of schools 
using school 
quality 
indicators at the 
municipality 
level. 
• Grade progression 
(completed) 
• Type of School 
• Teacher/student 
ratio 
Medium term 
impacts of the 
program in grade 
progression, 
completion and 
test scores are 
higher in general 
and technical 
secondary 
schools, than in 
those schools 
that rely on 
teleconferences. 
A lower 
student/teacher 
ratio also leads to 
a higher number 
of grades 
completed. 
Bobonis & 
Finan, 2009, 
Neighborhood 
Non-
experimental 
analysis that 
• Enrollment (peer 
effect) 
• Grade Progression 
• Type of school 
• Number of groups 
and classrooms 
The evaluation 
finds no 
substantive 
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Peer Effects in 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
Decisions 
considers the 
effects of 
PROGRESA in 
non-eligible 
children living 
in the same 
village as 
PROGRESA 
beneficiaries. 
They consider 
PROGRESA as 
an exogenous 
shock to 
secondary 
school 
participation 
(an 
instrumental 
variable 
approach).  
Improvements 
in supply are 
used to rule out 
alternative 
explanations of 
enrollment 
improvements 
and as 
sensitivity tests 
for their 
estimates 
including 
supply 
variables.  
(peer effect) • Number of 
teachers 
• Teacher/student 
ratio 
• Teacher 
qualifications 
• Enrollment levels 
evidence of 
changes in 
supply due to the 
CCT. The 
number of 
teachers and 
student/teacher 
ratios is only 
slightly higher in 
PROGRESA 
schools, as well 
as teachers’ 
educational level 
in those schools. 
The study cannot 
rule out indirect 
effects of the 
program as 
teachers could 
respond to the 
increase interest 
in school in 
different ways 
that they cannot 
analyze with the 
available data.  
Maluccio, 
Murphy , & 
Regalia , 2009, 
Does Supply 
Matter? Initial 
Supply 
Conditions and 
the Effectiveness 
of Conditional 
Cash Transfers 
for Grade 
Progression in 
Nicaragua  
Quasi-
experimental. 
The evaluation 
relies on 
random 
assignment of 
the program 
with an intent-
to-treat 
approach. This 
evaluation 
incorporates 
supply-side 
• Number of 
approved grades 
progressed 
between the 
baseline survey 
and a later period 
• Schooling 
conditions 
 
• Time to school (at 
the child level) 
• School autonomy,  
• Number of grades 
offered,  
• Student-teacher 
ratio  
• Textbooks per 
student) 
 
RPS was more 
effective in areas 
with autonomous 
schools, 
suggesting 
flexibility at the 
school level 
better, enabled 
schools to 
respond to 
changing 
demand 
conditions. In 
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variables at two 
levels: 1) it 
conditions 
program effect 
estimations on 
initial supply, 
2) it estimates 
effects of the 
program on 
schooling 
supply. Cross-
over design to 
estimate effects 
over 4 years. 
areas with poor 
initial school 
supply 
conditions, the 
program was 
relatively more 
effective in 
improving school 
supply as 
measured by 
grade 
availability, 
number of 
sessions per day 
and number of 
teachers.  
Heinrich, 2006, 
Demand and 
Supply-Side 
Determinants of 
Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
Program 
Effectiveness 
In this study, 
non-
experimental 
methods are 
used to assess 
the impact of 
Argentina’s 
Becas program 
on students that 
receive the 
scholarship 
compared to 
those that did 
not, as well as 
those that had 
the Becas for 
different 
periods. A 
multi-level 
estimation is 
used to estimate 
the effect of 
school quality 
and 
management 
variables on 
educational 
attainment and 
performance in 
school. 
• Student school 
attendance and 
absences 
• Grade repetition 
• Performance 
(grades)  
• School completion 
rates.  
• The grade average 
of all enrolled 
students  
•  A rating (1–10) of 
the effectiveness 
of communication 
and the execution 
of program 
procedures by 
school 
administrators  
• A rating (1–4) of 
the contributions 
of the Becas 
program to 
retention of 
students  
• A rating (1–4) of 
the importance of 
school attributes 
that contributed to 
effective 
functioning of the 
Becas program  
Institutional 
capacity, 
conditions for 
learning and 
management had 
a positive effect 
on student 
performance. 
The evaluation 
also estimated a 
positive effect 
for the 
administrative 
support related to 
the Becas 
program in 
schooling 
outcomes. 
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